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The incident which “set off ” the riot was the arresting of  
some 80 people in a “blind pig” raid in the early hours of July 
23, Sunday morning. The police did not have adequate facilities 
to whisk off so many arrestees and in the considerable time it 
took to do so a crowd gathered. This incident illustrates the 
value of the summons over arrest.  The police should have 
anticipated that congregating scores of arrestees in the street 
would attract many bystanders—and that if they arrested only 
one or two and handed out “tickets” to the rest—trouble would 
have been avoided.
Arrest, search, and seizure
Once the “riot” began, police spread a huge net over the 
riot area and more or less pulled in everyone on the street, 
including many in moving cars. It is clear that an appreciable 
number of Negro citizens uninvolved in the riot were swept 
up and subjected to degrading conditions in jails for periods 
up to several weeks before being released. The Governor’s 
Emergency Proclamation imposed a nighttime curfew except 
for “emergency,” but left “emergency” undefined. 
Police attempted to standardize a search procedure whereby 
special “search units” (acting without warrants) allegedly acted 
on tips pouring in about the location of stolen property. There is 
reason to think that some units used so-called “tips” as an excuse 
for systematic searching of certain areas. It is doubtful that 
very many, if any, of the “waivers” obtained by heavily armed 
law enforcement officers operating in a “war atmosphere” were 
valid. After a few days, the officers had “available” printed forms 
which consenting occupants had to sign when giving permis-
sion. On August 7, these forms were amended to make it clear 
occupants could refuse permission.
Bail and detention conditions
The most flagrant abuses probably occurred with respect 
to bail. The Recorder’s Court acted as a “law enforcement 
agency” determined to keep the arrested Negroes off the 
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streets. With the exception of one or two judges, even bond 
for curfew violators was rarely, if ever, set at less than $10,000 
and sometimes at $15,000 or $25,000. Judge George Crockett, 
who is one of the 13 judges of Recorder’s Court, stated publicly 
at an NAACP state convention held on September 30 that most 
of the judges instructed the sheriff not to release an arrestee 
even if he could meet this high bond, but to check back with 
the judge who had set the bail, “presumably so that he could 
raise it still higher.”
Also contributing to prolonged detention was the apparent 
policy of the Governor, prosecutors—and most judges—to 
release no one until records were checked with the FBI to 
ascertain whether any prisoners were connected with Watts, 
Newark, or other riot spots (apparently none were) and hence 
“ringleaders” or “outside agitators.”∗
For the first five days after the riots began the majority 
of judges made no allowance for individual factors affecting 
the likelihood of the prisoner’s appearance for trial. Not 
infrequently, husband and wife were remanded to the sheriff’s 
custody with high bonds when their children were home alone. 
Five days after the riots began, the prosecutor started to move 
to reduce bail—on the basis of only one factor:  “previous 
arrest” record. 
Apparently it was easier to find “previous arrests” data than 
“conviction” data. It is unclear what arrests were included, e.g., 
drunken driving. But apparently “arrest for investigation of . . . ” 
was included. Our students’ findings disclose that slightly over 
3,000 of the 6,000 prisoners had a “previous arrest” record. 
The process of reviewing bail went on slowly for several 
weeks and many were in jail for a full month.   
Those in charge of the custody of the prisoners were 
extremely inefficient and much confusion reigned. Prisoners 
frequently were not transported to the court on time. There 
were many reports of “lost” prisoners. Mrs. Claudia Marcom, 
Program Administrator, Neighborhood Legal Services, stated 
at the NAACP convention that thousands of phone calls to the 
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police or the sheriff’s office were made by those trying to locate 
missing relatives or friends, and all these calls were referred to 
her office. 
There were horribly inadequate detention facilities. For 
example, some 1,000 prisoners were housed in an under-
ground police garage for at least several days. There was bitter 
comment at the NAACP meeting about Negro prisoners being 
“herded like cattle,” about degrading, brutalizing experiences, 
about Negroes being forced to stand for many hours or even 
days, and about men, women, and the elderly all being  
incarcerated together. 
Judge Crockett (and perhaps one other judge) departed from 
the general pattern, releasing about 10 per cent of the prisoners 
before him on personal recognizance, otherwise frequently 
setting bail of $500-$1,500. He had volunteer lawyers interview 
prisoners about their roots in the community, etc., and relied 
on their recommendations. Apparently, he processed about as 
many prisoners about as rapidly as his “mechanical” brethren. 
The Wayne County Circuit Court, whose regular activi-
ties had ceased and  whose 27 judges amounted to double the 
judicial manpower in the Recorder’s Court, offered judicial and 
clerical help for bail-setting and other matters, but this offer 
was refused, apparently on the ground that it wasn’t needed. 
Another unheeded suggestion was the use of federal 
probation personnel and possibly Wayne County probation staff 
to interview prisoners and on the basis of certain factors release 
some on personal recognizance. Judge Wade McCree of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (widely regarded as 
an outstanding judge) whose chambers are in Detroit, proposed 
that those with two or more “favorable criteria” (considering 
residence, property, job with seniority, children, no prior 
record) be released on personal recognizance. 
Just prior to the preliminary examinations, many prisoners 
had their high bonds reviewed. Apparently this was often done 
by the prosecutor’s office and the judges working in concert. 
In addition, the writ of habeas corpus was in effect 
“suspended” for at least the first week after the riots began. 
Several lawyers involved in the processing insist that various 
judges simply announced and/or put up signs that they would 
not entertain the writ. They were also told of the great difficul-
ties involved in trying to find the prisoners. Apparently some 
judges did state that “they would hear no petitions for a week.” 
The right to counsel—and to ‘effective’counsel
At the preliminary examination stage, there was a massive 
effort by members of the bar to organize volunteer attorneys 
to provide free defense for those in need. Several hundred 
attorneys turned out. Headquarters were set up in an empty 
Recorder’s Court courtroom and before each session volun-
teers with little or no criminal law experience were instructed 
as to law and practice.
One administrative point should be made. After a volunteer 
completed an examination he usually left the court, period.
At the “arraignment on the information” stage—the 
last step prior to the trials scheduled to begin in January, 
1968—probably about 80 percent were assigned counsel. 
Many observers report that most judges made too much use of 
the criminal lawyer “regulars” and little or no use of volunteer 
lawyers. There is reason to think this was for “patronage” 
purposes, and/or because the regulars would more often cop 
a plea and the volunteers would more often demand a trial. 
(Assigned counsel is paid on a “straight fee” basis and therefore 
it is against his economic interests to go to trial.) 
Typically only one or two attorneys were appointed at the 
rate of $200 per day to represent all the defendants needing 
counsel in a given courtroom on a given day, probably 70-
l00 defendants. (The days our students were there, only one 
assigned counsel was working in a given courtroom.) The only 
reason advanced in support of this practice was economy. If 
individual lawyers had been assigned to represent individual 
defendants at the standard fee of $25 or $30 per “arraign-
ment on the information,” this would have cost the county an 
estimated additional $1500-$2000 per day.  
Because a great deal of “plea bargaining” occurred at this 
point, it was a most “critical stage.” It appears that in many 
cases the prosecutor’s office exercised plenary power in 
deciding whether or not to reduce a charge from a felony, 
often “entering without breaking with intent to commit 
larceny” (carrying a five-year maximum) to a misdemeanor, say 
“entering without permission” (carrying a 90-day maximum) 
and frequently did so solely on the basis of one factor—prior 
criminal record. 
The lack of justice, or at least the lack of “appearance of 
justice” was aggravated by judicial practice. For example, several 
justices mechanically sentenced every “guilty plea defendant” 
to time he “already served” up to that point and gave him 
credit for that time, so that he could walk out free—but with a 
misdemeanor conviction. In effect, these judges communicated 
to defendants with no prior records “waiting on line” the quid 
pro quo for pleading guilty. These tactics exerted enormous 
pressure on these defendants to plead guilty to a misdemeanor 
“just to get it over with” and “get out.” 
Whatever can be said by way of mitigation of the deficien-
cies in the early stage because of the “war atmosphere” is 
inapplicable to the “arraignment on the information” stage. 
The “assembly line” methods at this relatively late step in the 
criminal process seem least defensible of all. 
